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What Happens When Police Robots
Violate the Constitution? Revisiting
the Qualified Inmunity Standard for
Excessive Force Litigation Under
§ 1983 Regarding Violations
Perpetrated by Robots
ABSTRACT

Public concern surrounding excessive use of force by police
officers and the overmilitarizationof the police continues to grow. The
use of police robots, both with and without artificial intelligence
capabilities, is already transformingthe practice of policing. Police use
of robots gained national attention on July 7, 2016, when Dallaspolice
used a robot to disarm and kill an active shooter who killed five and
injured several others in a hostage situation. The qualified immunity
doctrine was designed to protect police officers, but under the Supreme
Court's current qualified immunity framework, police robots may pose
a challenge to accomplishing that goal. This Note suggests a twopronged approach to the problem: (1) lessening the burden of proof for
plaintiffs to defeat qualified immunity claims in excessive force cases
where robots use force, and (2) carving out an exigent circumstances
exception to the heightened standard.
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Imagine you are at your friend's house. The police have a valid
no-knock' search warrant for the house. A police robot carrying a
battering ram in one claw and a flashbang grenade 2 in the other claw
1.
No-knock warrants are warrants that authorize the police to enter a person's home
to execute a valid search or arrest warrant without first knocking on the person's door and
announcing that they are police officers. See, e.g., Todd Witten, Note, Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty
Years After Ker the Supreme Court Addresses the Knock and Announce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REV.
447, 456 & n.63 (1996). No-knock warrants require a showing of reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing police presence would be dangerous, futile, or would hamper the
investigation of a crime. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997); see Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
2.
Flashbang grenades are a less lethal explosive device used to "stun" a suspect. See
Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2017) ('The [SWAT] manual classifies
flashbangs as explosives that can generate heat in 'excess of 2,000 degrees centigrade,' a flash of
light up to 80 times brighter than the flashbulb of a camera, and over 150 decibels of noise for
less than one half of a second."), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 72 (2017); Julia Angwin & Abbie
Nehring,
Hotter
Than
Lava,
PROPUBLICA
(Jan.
12,
2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/flashbangs [https://perma.cc/5MZ6-5F43]. Flashbang grenades

2018]

REVISITING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD

949

approaches the door. The robot transmits video of its surroundings
through a camera and microphone to police stationed thirty feet
outside the door. The robot uses the battering ram to open the door.
Then, the robot uses its other claw to throw the grenade into the living
room. You hear a loud bang followed by a second bang. The living
room immediately erupts in smoke and catches fire, and you sustain
serious injuries. Human police officers enter your friend's home after
the robot throws the flashbang grenade.
You decide to sue the police officer who authorized the robot's
use of force, alleging that the police violated your Fourth Amendment
You know that the Fourth Amendment to the US
rights.3
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be free from
"unreasonable searches and seizures." 4 You also know that if a
reasonable officer in that circumstance would find it appropriate to
use force, there is justification for the use of force. 5 Finally, you know
that some courts hold that a human police officer throwing a
flashbang grenade without first inspecting the premises almost
certainly violates the Fourth Amendment. 6 Thus, it seems likely that
a robot's use of the flashbang grenade without prior inspection also
violates the Fourth Amendment.
In spite of the Fourth Amendment violation, your suit fails at
the summary judgment stage.7 The court acknowledges that the
police use of excessive force through the robot violated your Fourth
Amendment rights, but the officers at your friend's home who
authorized the robot's use of force enjoyed qualified immunity.8 Police
are reasonable only when: (1) police have reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is
dangerous; (2) the police have inspected the area for possible innocent people before throwing the
flashbang grenade; and (3) police carry a fire extinguisher. See, e.g., Estate of Escobedo v.
Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2010).
3.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated[.]"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (establishing a civil cause of action for constitutional
violations committed by government officials).
4.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5.
Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("[I]ts proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.").
See, e.g., Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1042; Bender, 600 F.3d at 785; Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374
6.
F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to inspect an area before throwing a flashbang
grenade is unreasonable); cf Krause v. Jones, 765 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging
that using flashbang grenades in an area occupied by innocent parties also weighs against
reasonableness).
7.
Cf. Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1042 (dismissing case at summary judgment).
This scenario is very similar to the situation in Dukes. See id. There, police executed
8.
a search warrant based on probable cause for evidence of marijuana at 5:30 AM. Id. at 1044.
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officers benefit from qualified immunity for violations of constitutional

rights that are not "clearly established" at the time of the official's
misconduct. 9 Courts made it clear that they intend to provide police
officers, who make dangerous decisions in split-second situations, with
large amounts of protection and discretion in how they do their jobs. 10
Courts typically determine whether qualified immunity attaches at
the summary judgment stage." The Supreme Court stated that it
defers very heavily to police officers in excessive force cases because it
wants to protect human police officers making split-second decisions. 12
The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit previously upheld
the use of flashbang grenades to secure homes prior to the exercise of
a nonexigent search warrant. 13
However, a robot is not a human being. A human police officer
who puts a robot into a dangerous situation as opposed to putting his
own human body into a dangerous situation should not enjoy the same
level of discretion because, simply put, it is common sense that human
lives are more valuable than a robot's mechanical appendages.

Human police officers used flashbang grenades to clear the premises without attempting to
inspect the premises. Id. at 1042. Had police inspected the premises before detonating the
flashbang grenades, they would have been able to discern that the house's occupants were
sleeping. See id. at 1040. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that while
the residents' constitutional rights had been violated, the police made a reasonable mistake
because drug suspects are known to be armed and information about the suspect owning a gun

was in the warrant. Id. at 1043-44.
9.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
819 (1982) ("The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts.
Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by
such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official's duties legitimately require
action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences."' (footnote
omitted)); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Note that § 1983 also establishes a cause of action for
violations of statutory rights by government officials; however, this Note only addresses § 1983's
application to Fourth Amendment violations by police. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See, e.g., Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1045; Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695
10.
(1st Cir. 1994).
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ("Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
11.
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of
government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On
summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable
law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred." (footnote
omitted)); Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond
Summary Judgment When Resolving Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REV.
135, 136 (2007).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
12.
Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2010).
13.
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Use of robots by civilian police departments is not new. 14 What
is new is the police use of robots to inflict deadly force on US civilians,
underscoring the need for different standards when police use
unmanned robots.1 5 For example, on July 7, 2016, Dallas police chief
David Brown authorized the use of a remote-controlled robot to kill
Micah Xavier Johnson after Johnson killed two police officers and
gravely injured several others. 16
For the purpose of this Note, a "robot" is a device that operates
unmanned, regardless of its capacity for artificial intelligence (Al). 17
Many people predict that sophisticated police robots will eventually
become "useful, cheap, and ubiquitous."18
Police robots have the potential to decrease risks police officers
face by replacing human officers in dangerous situations.1 9 Police
departments already use robots to deliver cell phones in hostage
negotiation situations and scout potentially dangerous premises. 20
Military robots already apply coercive force against foreign enemies. 21
Many technologies initially developed for military use end up in the
hands of local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) through the 1033
Program. 22 On August 28, 2017, President Donald Trump rescinded

14.
DRONE,

See DAN GETTINGER & ARTHUR HOLLAND MICHEL, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ROBOTS DATASHEET 1 (2016), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/fi1es/

2016/07/LEO-Robots-CSD-7-16-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ3V-6FEK]; see also Drew Kann, Why
AM),
2017,
9:54
CNN
(Apr.
18,
Robots,
Your
Local Police Force Loves
http://www.cnn.com/2016/1 1/10/us/police-officers-future-technology-lisa-ling/index.html
[https://perma.cc/57ZJ-VJBR].
See Damon Beres, This Is the Robot Dallas Police Used to Kill Shooting Suspect,
15.
HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2016, 12:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/dallas-police[https://perma.cclB8C9-GNKC]; see also Andy
bomb-robot us_5783bcOde4bO1edea78eb6Oc
Campbell & Willa Frej, Sniper Attack Leaves 5 Police Officers Dead, 7 Injured in Dallas,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dallas-protestHUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2016),
shooting-us_577f0a0ce4b0344d514eb552 [https://perma.cc/2SM8-6H48].
16.
Sarah Sidner & Mallory Simon, How Robot, Explosives Took Out Dallas Sniper in
Unprecedented Way, CNN (July 12, 2016, 8:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/us/dallaspolice-robot-c4-explosives/ [https://perma.cc/RQ3Q-ETK5]. Eventually, five people died due to
injuries inflicted by Johnson. Campbell & Frej, supra note 15.
Liability for harmful actions committed by Al-possessing robots is also in dispute.
17.
See generally Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Keeping AI Legal, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133,
135 (2016).
18.
Elizabeth E. Job, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 516, 518
(2016).
19.
See id. at 526-27.
See Reinhardt v. Feller, No. 1:08-cv-00329 LJO DLB HC, 2008 WL 5386802, at *3
20.
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2008); Job, supra note 18, at 519.
21.
See Job, supra note 18, at 521.
22.
Id. at 528 ("For instance, the so-called '1033 Program,' part of the National Defense
Authorization Security Act of 1997, is the federal initiative that has transferred surplus military
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restrictions on military equipment available to police through the
1033 Program, allowing more advanced weaponry to pass into the
hands of local police departments. 23 Thus, more ubiquitous use of
coercive force effectuated by police robots is likely on the horizon.
Robots, regardless of whether they possess Al capacities,
change the calculus of police work. 24 There are no publicly available
explicit policies and procedures governing robot use in policing. This
lack of procedural guidance raises broader constitutional questions. 25
A police robot can disarm a suspect or secure premises for a search
warrant without placing human lives on the line. Police are more
accurately able to assess risk without putting their own lives at risk.
As a result, the police should not enjoy the same level of deference
when using excessive force without putting human flesh into a
dangerous situation.
This Note suggests a modified approach to qualified immunity
and discovery in excessive force lawsuits when a police robot is the
entity implementing the excessive force. Part I of this Note discusses
different robots that are currently available or in development for
military use. That Part contends that because there is little oversight,
the 1033 Program-which facilitates transfers of robots and other
equipment to police departments-suffers from poor regulation. Part
II argues that application of current legal theories surrounding police
robot liability requires a detailed analysis of attached issues of
qualified immunity. Extending qualified immunity to cases where the
actor is a police robot will further complicate discovery and make it
significantly harder for plaintiffs to recover in excessive force cases.
As a solution, Part III of this Note suggests a two-prong test for
determining whether qualified immunity should attach in cases
alleging that a robot actor used excessive force. The first prong
creates a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness when a robot
carries out the disputed force, which can be rebutted at the summary
judgment stage.
The second prong carves out an exigent
circumstances or imminent danger exception to the modified
reasonableness standard.

equipment such as MRAPs (Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles), grenade launchers,
and amphibious tanks to local police departments." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
23.
See Exec. Order No. 13,809, 82 Fed. Reg. 41499, 41499 (Aug. 28, 2017); Tom
Jackman, Trump to Restore Program Sending Surplus Military Weapons, Equipment to Police,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
27,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/truecrime/wp/20 17/08/27/trump-restores-program-sending-surplus-military-weapons-equipment-to-

police/?utm_term=.a473f8055339 [https://perma.cc/J63T-CG55].
24.
Joh, supra note 18, at 519.
25.
Melissa Hamilton, Police Robots and the Law, 31 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
1, 5(2016).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The DallasPolice Shooting: A New Frontierin Police Use of Robots
On July 7, 2016, Dallas police used a Remotec Andros Mark
V-Al robot, a robot lacking Al, to kill Micah Xavier Johnson, an Army
veteran who opened fire at a peaceful Black Lives Matter protest in
downtown Dallas and killed five police officers while injuring seven
others. 26 Following a forty-five-minute gun battle and two hours of
failed negotiations with Johnson, police turned to the Mark V-Al
robot. 2 7 The Dallas police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit
fashioned a pound of C-4, an explosive substance, into a ball and
placed it on the Mark V-A1. 2 8 Using its extension arm, the robot then
lodged the ball of C-4 into the wall Johnson was hiding behind. 29 At
the time of detonation, Johnson had already murdered two police
officers, and later, three other police officers died from their injuries. 30
Northrop Grumman, the company that manufactures the Mark
V-Al, touts the robot as having the following features: (1) a
surveillance camera with 216:1 zoom, (2) a 40:1 zoom ratio stationary
arm camera, (3) a multiple-mission tool, (4) sensor mounts with
plug-and-play capabilities, (5) grippers with continuous rotators, (6)
quick release pneumatic wheels, and (7) gripping technology. 31 While
the use of explosive material deployed through a robot to kill Johnson
was clearly justified when considering Supreme Court precedent, the
continued use of police robots in the absence of greater policies and
procedures will raise broader constitutional and regulatory
questions. 32

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
[hereinafter

Beres, supra note 15; Campbell & Frej, supra note 15.
Sidner & Simon, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mark 5A-1: Highly Versatile, Robust, All-Terrain Platform, NORTHROP GRUMMAN
Mark

5A-1],

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/Remotec/Products/

Pages/Mark5A1.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z7TE-5W6X] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Hamilton, supra note 25, at 6.
32.
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B. The 1033 Programand the Inevitability of Artificial Intelligence in
Policing: The Need for Heightened Regulation of Robot Use of Force
1. The 1033 Program: An Overview
The 1033 Program, in operation since 1997, transfers
cutting-edge military technology-like robots-to domestic LEAs. 33
Congress authorizes the transfer of surplus federal military
equipment to domestic LEAs at no cost to the recipient. 34 Municipal
police departments; federal
enforcement agencies, such as
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); state police departments and highway
patrols; university police departments; and school districts have all
received surplus military tactical equipment through the 1033
Program. 3 5
The 1033 Program officially began when the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1997 granted permanent authority for the
Secretary of Defense to transfer unused military equipment from the
Department of Defense (DOD) to LEAs. 36 However, transfers of
military equipment to civilian police departments existed long before
the program's enactment.3 7
Title XI of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1989 (1989 NDAA) established the DOD as the
lead federal government agency in detecting and stopping drug
trafficking. 38 The 1989 NDAA also authorized the DOD to use or to
make available to any federal, state, or local LEA any
equipment-including tactical military equipment-in furtherance of
that goal. 39 The following year's NDAA authorized the DOD to
directly transfer excess equipment suitable for counterdrug activities

33.
See Shawn Musgrave et al., The Pentagon Finally Details Its Weapons-for-Cops
Giveaway, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 3, 2014, 7:35 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2014/12/03/the-pentagon-finally-details-its-weapons-for-cops-giveaway#.e1J6vIf6r
[https://perma.cc/D8TL-RQLF]; see also Taylor Wofford, How America's Police Became an Army:

The 1033 Program, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/how("It was
[https://perma.cc/AT8Z-UTR59]
americas-police-became-army- 1033-program-264537
called the 1208 Program. In 1996, Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033.").
10 U.S.C. § 2576a(a) (2012); see Musgrave et al., supra note 33.
34.
35.

See Musgrave et al., supra note 33.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, §
36.
1033, 110 Stat. 2422, 2639-40 (1996) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (2012)); DANIEL
H. ELSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43701, THE "1033 PROGRAM," DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
2
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43701.pdf
SUPPORT
TO
LAW
ENFORCEMENT

[https://perma.cc/SHU6-8ZY8].
ELSE, supra note 36, at 1-2.
37.
Id. at 1.
38.
Id.
39.
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to any federal, state, or local LEA. 40 The provision was originally
intended to sunset in 1992; however, the 1992 authorization extended
the sunset date to 199741 and the 1997 NDAA permanently authorized
such transfers.42
The 1033 Program is responsible for facilitating the transfer of
robot technology to police departments. As of July 2016, the 1033
Program had transferred at least 987 robots, together worth over
$55.2 million, to LEAs across the United States. 43 Local, not federal,
police departments comprise the majority of robot acquisitions
through the 1033 Program. 44 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 1033
Program has faced criticism for the lack of oversight and specialized
training provided to local LEAs before the DOD equips them with
military-grade weapons. 45
2. The 1033 Program Is Poorly Regulated
Critics have argued the DOD does not properly regulate the
1033 Program given the lack of training requirements for local LEAs
receiving military-grade weapons and the lack of oversight regarding
who receives what equipment.4 6 Because the DOD designed the 1033
Program,4 7 the equipment being transferred is presumably the same
as that used in the military. In the wake of the use of military
weapons by police during the Ferguson, Missouri, protests in 2014,
President Barack Obama attempted to increase federal oversight of
the 1033 Program. Executive Order 13,688, signed on January 16,
2015, established a task group to identify potential agency actions
that could improve federal oversight of the 1033 Program and the
equipment provided to LEAs.4 8 Stated goals of the proposed agency
actions included (1) increasing transparency in the equipment
transferred to LEAs, (2) establishing a process to review the types of
equipment eligible for the 1033 Program, (3) developing policies to
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.

43.

GETTINGER & MICHEL, supra note 14, at 3.

44.
See id. at 2.
45.
Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline: Defense Contractors and the Police
Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2015); Gregory T. Kiley, Police with
Military

Gear:

Better

Training

Needed,

REAL

CLEAR

POL'Y

(Nov.

10,

2015),

http://www.realclearpolicy.com/blog/2015/1 1/11/policewithmilitary-gear better trainingneede
d_1466.html [https://perma.cc/N37X-TP45]; Musgrave et al., supra note 33.
46.
Kiley, supra note 45.
47.
Rahall, supra note 45, at 1791.
Exec. Order No. 13,688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451, 3451 (Jan. 16, 2015), revoked by Exec.
48.
Order No. 13,809, 82 Fed. Reg. 41499 (Aug. 28, 2017).
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ensure that LEAs receiving equipment abide by limitations and
obligations set forth by the federal government, (4) requiring
after-action analysis for significant actions involving controlled federal
equipment, and (5) creating a database to track all equipment
disbursed to LEAs. 4 9 The government instituted few other regulations
or bans on the distribution of particular types of tactical equipment,
including robots.5 0 However, on August 28, 2017, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions announced that the restrictions promulgated by
Executive Order 13,688 would be rescinded.5 1
The 1033 Program largely entrusts military technology
acquired by local LEAs to SWAT teams, which also lack
transparency. 52 The majority of cases in which police use SWAT
Almost 80 percent of SWAT team
teams involve narcotics. 53
of search warrants. 5 4 According to a
for
the
execution
deployments are
2014 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report that analyzed
eight hundred SWAT team deployments between 2011 and 2012, only
7 percent of such deployments were for hostage, barricade, or active
Information about SWAT team deployments
shooter scenarios.5 5
remains very difficult for members of the public to obtain.5 6
C. Other Uses of Robotics in Police and Military Training
Use of robots in policing is not new. At least 280 domestic
police forces currently possess police robots, not including domestic
LEAs that purchased robots without the use of federal funds.5 7
Between 2007 and 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) awarded twenty-five
grants-worth at least $2.63 million in total-to local and state LEAs

49.
50.
51.

Exec. Order No. 13,688, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3452-53.
Rahall, supra note 45, at 1790.
Jackman, supra note 23.

52.

ACLU, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING

21-22, 27 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-webrell.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KUM-SHGL]; see Rahall, supra note 45, at 1792.
ACLU, supra note 52, at 31.
53.
54.
Radley Balko, New ACLU Report Takes a Snapshot of Police Militarization in the
United States, WASH. POST (June 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/20 14/06/24/new-aclu-report-takes-a-snapshot-of-police-militarization-in-the-unitedstates/?utm_term=.a412ea20996e [https://perma.cc/X5KV-FDUE].
ACLU, supra note 52, at 2, 5.
55.
Id. at 5, 27. In 2014, the ACLU filed public records requests for data about SWAT
56.
team deployments with more than 255 LEAs. Id. at 27. Of that group, 114 denied the requests
either in whole or in part. Id.
57.

Hamilton, supra note 25, at 1.
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for purchasing and upgrading robots.5 8
The DOJ and DHS also
awarded federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), $6.25 million in grants for the same purpose. 59 The DOJ gave
nine of the ten largest contracts for robot development to either the
FBI or the ATF.6 0 Northrup Grumman, a global security company,
was the largest single recipient of grants, receiving $2.43 million in
total. 61 All of this spending is in addition to the estimated $55,232,278
worth of robots that the federal government transferred to local and
state LEAs through the 1033 Program. 62 This represents a massive
investment on behalf of these federal agencies.
Police frequently use robots to reinstate communication in
hostage situations and standoffs. 63 For example, consider the standoff
situation in Reinhardt v. Feller,64 where police used a robot to monitor
and restart communications with a suspect.6 5 At the time the robot
entered, the police knew that the suspect's home contained several
guns. 66 In fact, the suspect's house contained one handgun, twenty
shotguns, and a 257 Roberts rifle, used for shooting big game from up
to four miles away. 67 The suspect reportedly yelled threats at SWAT
Police deployed a robot
officials positioned outside the house.68
equipped with cameras, a microphone, and speakers. 69 The robot
broke a window with a window punch in its claw and entered the
home. 70 Police communicated with the suspect through the robot.7 1
The suspect shot at the robot 72 and fired shots outside the house. 73

58.

GETTINGER & MICHEL, supra note 14, at 3.

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

61.

Id.;

NORTHROP

GRUMMAN,

http://www.northropgrumman.com/Pages/default.aspx

(last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
62.

GETTINGER & MICHEL, supra note 14, at 3.

63.
See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Feller, No. 1:08-cv-00329 LJO DLB HC, 2008 WL 5386802, at
*2-3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2008). Note that the facts of this case are being used to illustrate a
situation in which a robot aided a dangerous standoff situation. The use of the robot was not in
dispute in this litigation.
Id.
64.
Id. at *3.
65.
66.
Id. at *2.
Id.
67.
68.
Id. at *3 ("During the negotiations, appellant repeatedly threatened to kill: 'you pull
a gun on me and you know what? I will kill instantly.' 'I'm not worried about your little SWAT
team. What I've got in my hand pokes holes right through bullet proof vests ....
Id.
69.
70.
Id.
71.
See id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
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Due-at least in part-to the robot's role in the standoff, no one was
hurt.7 4 Without robots, police officers would likely face greater risks of
harm in situations similar to Reinhardt.
The military currently develops autonomous robots for combat
capacities and drones with AI capabilities.7 5 The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on a drone that would
have AI capabilities and would not need a human remotely controlling
it.76 In October 2016, DARPA tested a drone that could identify people
carrying AK-47s within a makeshift village in Fort Edwards,
Massachusetts.7 7 Autonomous aircraft that could travel alongside
manned aircraft in combat are in development by the DOD.7 8 The
Pentagon's most recent budget committed $18 billion to developing
necessary technologies to create combat robots that can function
autonomously.7 9 The Pentagon expects to have these combat robots
functioning by 2025.80 If the US military uses autonomous robots en
masse, these robots are very likely to enter the arsenal of civilian
police forces through the 1033 Program.8 1
D. Current Theories of Robot Criminal Liability Mandate a Discussion
of Qualified Immunity When Applied to Police Officers
Determining the standard for criminal culpability for the bad
actions of robots runs into challenges since almost every criminal act
requires the showing of a certain mens rea. 82 Robots, however, cannot
currently exhibit a mens rea. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which governs use of autonomous robots in military
combat, has yet to adopt a standard for determining criminal liability
74.
Id. at *5.
Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon's 'Terminator Conundrum':
75.
Robots
That
Could
Kill
on
Their
Own,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html?_r=O
[https://perma.cc/JJJ4-DDXB].
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
80.
Jon Lockett, US Military Will Have More Combat Robots Than Human Soldiers by
2025, N.Y. POST (June 15, 2017, 4.58 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/06/15/us-military-will-havesee also
[https://perma.cc/47B7-8EUN];
more-combat-robots-than-human-soldiers-by-2025/
Rosenberg & Markoff, supra note 75.
Job, supra note 18, at 528; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot 0. Sprague, Drones, 17
81.
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673, 735 (2015) (predicting that manufacturers of military-grade
drones will likely adapt the technology for civilian use).
82.
Joh, supra note 18, at 536; see Gabriel Hallevy, "I, Robot - I, Criminal"-When
Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22
SYRACUSE Sci. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 7 (2010).
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when robots are in use; however, the International Court of Justice
and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
suggest that the operator should be held liable. 83 Indeed, a model code
that views robots as purely innocent actors at the control of a human
element may work, but only to a certain extent. 84 Under such a model,
the "operator" of the robot (in this case, the police officer) would face
full culpability,8 5 which may work as a model for regulating police
robots currently in use. Culpability would therefore rest solely on the
police officers for the actions of robots under human control, but such
a standard will not work when police departments begin using robots
with Al, as they will not have operators. Allowing Al systems to make
decisions raises questions; 86 the answers to those questions become
more important when Al decisions have potentially irreversible
consequences.
E. Qualified Immunity: Heavy Deference to Police Officers, but Do
Robots Deserve the Same Deference?
Legal standards governing use of force by police departments
assume that police officers act under an imminent threat to their
safety.8 7 In fact, the Supreme Court operated under that assumption
in establishing precedent that defers heavily to police officers in
granting qualified immunity.8 8 As a result, successful suit against
police departments requires a showing of deliberate indifference to
constitutional violations, and successfully suing the officers that
authorized a particular use of excessive force requires overcoming an
See Kelly Cass, Autonomous Weapons and Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the
83.
Law of War, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1058-59 (2015); see also id. at 1057-58 ("Because an
autonomous weapon is not capable of committing a war crime [under the Rome Statute], the
question is . . . who should be held accountable when the use of an autonomous weapon fails to
comply with the Law of War." (emphasis in original)).
See Hallevy, supra note 82, at 9.
84.
Id. at 10-11.
85.
See, e.g., Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots:
86.
Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 404
(2017) ("These Al systems present a spectrum of immediate issues that may require a regulatory
response. Some are likely to be dealt with by developers as they come to their attention, and end
users of the system may deal with others as they refine their use of the system and work with
developers in overcoming issues as and when they arise.").

87.
Joh, supra note 18, at 537.
See Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical
88.
Application of § 1983 as It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L.
REV. 571, 575 (2005); cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) ("The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.").
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onerous qualified immunity standard.8 9 In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, the Supreme Court established a cause of action
against federal officials who violate citizens' constitutional rights,
while 42 U.S.C. § 1983 establishes the same cause of action against
state and local officials.9 0 This Note, however, only focuseson state
and local officials under § 1983. Using deadly force against a suspect
constitutes a seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment.9 1 In
excessive force cases, the Supreme Court applies an objective
reasonableness standard to determine whether qualified immunity

attaches.92
1. Sue the Police Departments? Good Luck!
Victims of excessive force already face difficulties in recovering
against police departments and municipalities. 93 The Supreme Court
established a standard for municipal qualified immunity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.94 In order to hold a municipality liable under § 1983,
the plaintiff must establish that (1) a constitutional violation took
place, (2) a government policy or custom caused the constitutional
violation, and (3) the policy represents deliberate indifference to
constitutional violations that may reasonably occur as a result of the
policy. 9 5 This creates a steep burden of proof for plaintiffs trying to
recover for excessive force violations.
2. Sue the Officers Who Authorized the Force? Good Luck with That,
Too.
Another option for victims is to sue the individual police officer
who authorized the force, but that can also be difficult.9 6 In Graham
89.
Blum, supra note 88, at 575.
90.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
91.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985).
92.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (holding that determining whether the force used to effect
a particular seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of
"the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests"

against the countervailing governmental interests at stake).
93.
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Note that local governments
do not receive the benefits of qualified immunity; however, the hurdle to sue governments under
Monell essentially establishes the same barrier for suits against municipalities. See id. at 701.
94.
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989); City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
95.
See Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-89; Heller, 475 U.S. at 799; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
96.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009) (holding that the rigid Saucier
procedure is not the mandatory test for qualified immunity against § 1983 claims); Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197, 206 (2001); Graham, 490 U.S. at 399 ("The Fourth Amendment inquiry
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v. Connor, the Court held that courts must analyze all excessive force
claims under § 1983 using a standard of objective reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to a due process standard. 97
Police officers enjoy considerable levels of deference in situations
similar to the facts of Graham, wherein the Court held that the
"calculus of reasonableness" in determining whether a particular use
of force passes muster "must embody allowance for the fact that police
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." 98
Factors courts consider when determining objective reasonableness
include the severity of the crime allegedly committed, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of either officers or
others, and whether the suspect is actively trying to resist arrest or
flee. 99 The Fourth Amendment authorizes police use of deadly force
when police have probable cause to believe that the suspect is a
violent felon and probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed
and dangerous. 100
In litigating excessive force claims against police officers, the
qualified immunity analysis must be done separately from the
excessive force analysis. 101 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court
presented a two-part test for determining whether an officer enjoys
qualified immunity for disputed actions. 102 First, the facts alleged in
the complaint must suggest that the officer violated a constitutional
right. 103 Second, the constitutional right allegedly violated must have
been clearly established at the time of violation. 104 A constitutional
right is clearly established if every reasonable officer in that
particular situation would have understood that his conduct violated
that particular right. 105 If the constitutional right was not clearly
established, the officer enjoys qualified immunity by virtue of the
position he holds.10 6 Subsequently, the Court's decision in Pearson v.

is one of 'objective reasonableness' under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like 'malice'
and 'sadism' have no proper place in that inquiry.").

97.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 396-97.
98.
Id. at 396.
99.
100.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
101.
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
102.
See id. at 201.
See id.
103.
104.
See id.
105.
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987).
106.
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 207.
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Callahan allowed for a grant of qualified immunity without
performing a Saucier analysis.1 0 7 Pearson held that lower courts may
decide which prong of the Saucier test to analyze first and may
exercise greater discretion in granting qualified immunity. 108 Put
differently, if a reasonable officer could have justified the conduct
considering the circumstances, courts do not have to discuss whether
the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. 109 However, a
defendant who benefits from qualified immunity may still have its
actions reviewed for whether the actions established a constitutional
violation. 110 In loosening the Saucier standard, the Court intended to
encourage judicial efficiency and protect officers' decisions in the line
of duty.1 11
Parties litigate qualified immunity at the summary judgment
112
Summary judgment is typically appropriate upon a showing
stage.
of no disputed facts, which entitles the movant to judgment as a
matter of law. 113 Qualified immunity for excessive force claims
against police officers is especially difficult to litigate at the summary
judgment stage because the fact-heavy nature of determining whether
the right was clearly established makes it difficult to litigate as a
matter of law. 114 This task is further complicated when robot actors
are involved. The question of whether the constitutional right was
clearly established prior to the alleged violation is more fact
dependent in excessive force cases than it is in other suits against
public officials because it depends on what the officer knew at the time
objective
The
dangerousness.1 1 5
suspect's
the
regarding
right
established
a
clearly
of
determining
standard
unreasonableness
is oftentimes more of a "subjective unreasonableness" standard
because it depends heavily on what the officer on the scene believed,
what facts were known to officers at the time, and, most importantly,
what the situation actually was.11 6

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that the rigid Saucier
107.
procedure is not the mandatory test for qualified immunity against § 1983 claims).
Id.
108.
See id.
109.
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 713 (2011).
110.
See id. at 707.
111.
Ravenell, supra note 11, at 135-36.
112.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
113.
See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 121 (2009); John C.
114.
Jeffries, What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 855 (2010); Ravenell,
supra note 11, at 136.
See Jeffries, supra note 114, at 861.
115.
Id.
116.
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For these reasons, qualified immunity cases are heavily fact
In Willingham v. Loughnan, the Eleventh Circuit
dependent.1 17
granted qualified immunity to police officers who shot a suspect twice
during the course of intervening in a confrontation between the
The court reasoned that
suspect and the suspect's brother.1 18
although the police officers' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment,
the right at issue was not clearly established at the time because
every reasonable officer would not have known that said use of force
was excessive considering the circumstances.1 19 Similarly, in Bing ex
rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, the Sixth Circuit held that deploying a
second flashbang grenade to get a suspect out of his house-ultimately
setting the suspect's home on fire-violated the suspect's Fourth
120
Amendment rights, but the right was not clearly established.
In Milan v. Bolin, the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of
qualified immunity for police who used flashbang grenades pursuant
to a search for a suspect who allegedly sent threats to police officers
via the Internet. 121 The suspect sent the threats from the plaintiffs
WiFi network, but the police failed to ascertain that the network was
an open network that others nearby could access. 122 A day after the
flashbang grenade search, an investigation by police showed that the
actual intended suspect-who possessed a violent past criminal
history-lived in a different home on the same street and accessed the
open network. 12 3 The court cited the totality of the circumstances as
the reason for denying qualified immunity: the flashbang grenades,
the fact that the search happened prior to a more detailed
investigation, and that a proper investigation could have identified the
actual suspect and correct house. 12 4 The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to several qualified immunity excessive force cases,

Hassel, supra note 114, at 121; see, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)
117.
(concluding after a fact-intensive discussion that "it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a
warrant").

Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
118.
qualified immunity attached when police shot an unarmed suspect after the suspect had thrown
a kitchen knife and bottles at the police), vacated, 537 U.S. 801 (2002), modified, 321 F.3d 1299
(11th Cir. 2003); Jeffries, supra note 114, at 864.
Willingham, 261 F.3d at 1187; Jeffries, supra note 114, at 864; see Willingham v.
119.
Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) ("Our earlier conclusion remains unaffected by
the Supreme Court's decision . . . . We reinstate our prior opinion and judgment and supplement
our earlier discussion of qualified immunity with this opinion.").
Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2006).
120.
121.
Milan v. Bolin, 795 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2015).
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
Id.
124.
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ultimately upholding qualified immunity in all of them. 12 5 Out of
twenty-nine qualified immunity cases where the Supreme Court
applied the objective reasonableness test, the Court only found
violations of clearly established constitutional rights in two of them. 126
Two other cases were "partial victories" for plaintiffs. 127
3. Illegal Motive Pleading Requirements and Summary Judgment
Make It Even More Difficult-Robots Cannot Express a Mental State
Plaintiffs alleging excessive force against police robots face an
even steeper road in jurisdictions that require pleading either illegal
motive or malice to defeat a qualified immunity claim. 128 As robots
with Al capabilities enter the police force, the question of whether a
human operator can even be held liable for a machine's decisions may
be raised. 129 Autonomous robots merely simulate human thinking;
therefore, they are not entitled to constitutional protection of their
"bodies."1 30 A police officer's safety is incredibly important, while the
issue of whether a drone makes it out of a dangerous situation still
functioning is a lesser concern for a court to protect. Even when
placing total responsibility on the "human supervisor" using a full
culpability model, mere negligence would not overcome qualified
immunity due to the "clearly established right" requirement. 131
Questions of who authorized the force-whether the robot merely
"malfunctioned" or was "piloted" by an officer to use the force-often
cannot be litigated at the summary judgment stage because facts are
typically in dispute at that stage of the proceeding.
4. The Supreme Court Has Been Unwilling to Discuss Modifications of
Qualified Immunity
A proposed modification of qualified immunity, in the form of a
provocation doctrine, came before the Supreme Court in County of Los
Angeles v. Mendez.1 32 In Mendez, police entered the plaintiffs home
125.
See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 312
(2015); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).
126.
William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82-83
(2018).
Id.
127.
128.
See Cass, supra note 83, at 1062.
129.
Cf. Guihot, Matthew & Suzor, supra note 86, at 418-19 (discussing (and dismissing)
a "light touch" approach to assigning tort liability for autonomous vehicles in which the least cost
avoider assumes liability for any harm caused by the vehicle).
See Cass, supra note 83, at 1058.
130.
131.
See discussion supra Part ID; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
132.
Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017).
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without notice or a warrant. 133 At the time of entry, the plaintiff had
pulled out a BB gun, and the police ultimately shot the plaintiff and
his wife, leading to the eventual amputation of his right leg. 134
Neither party disputed the reasonableness of the shooting. 135 Before
the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff argued-and won-that but for the
police's Fourth Amendment violation in entering the home, there
would have been no need for the him to pull out a BB gun: the illegal
entry proximately caused the need for the force. 136 The Supreme
Court held that a prior Fourth Amendment violation cannot provide
the basis for defeating qualified immunity on the excessive force
claim. 137 However, the Court did not address the "every reasonable
officer" standard for determining clearly established rights in
excessive force cases as put forth in Graham.138 The Court merely
held that because the Ninth Circuit's provocation doctrine was invalid
and the shooting was independently reasonable, an analysis of the
"clearly established right" prong was unnecessary. 139
II. ANALYSIS
Modification of existing precedent around excessive force in
cases where a robot uses unconstitutional force is the most politically
plausible and effective means to regulate the use of police robots. The
restriction or elimination of tactical equipment distribution through
the 1033 Program is not politically plausible because the program
enjoys popularity from both political parties and police unions. 140
Professor Christopher Slobogin's exigency and proportionality
principles, on the other hand, may provide a framework for analyzing
the constitutionality of a particular incident of robotic use of force. 141
Applying the exigency and proportionality principles to robotic use of
force suggests a modification to the qualified immunity standard when
a robot actor applies the force. A modification to the qualified
immunity standard gives victims of robotic police excessive force an
easier path to recovery, protects police officers acting in dangerous

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 1544.
Id. at 1544-55.
Id. at 1548-49.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1546-47.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
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split-second situations, and conforms to the Supreme Court's policy
142
motivation in its application of qualified immunity.

A. Regulating or Eliminating the 1033 Program Is Not Politically
Plausible
Proposed methods to curb tactical gear distributions by the
1033 Program include limiting access to only those tactical purposes
originally statutorily enumerated-counterdrug and counterterrorism
activities-and elimination of the 1033 Program altogether. 143
However, restriction of tactical gear distributions through the 1033
Program or elimination of the Program in its entirety are not
currently politically plausible ways to regulate the use of police robots.
The 1033 Program enjoys a great deal of political support. 144 The
United States' largest police union, the Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP), supports and lobbies for further removal of restrictions on
tactical gear distribution from the 1033 Program. 145 On August 28,
2017, at the FOP convention in Nashville, Tennessee, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions announced that President Donald Trump
planned to rescind restrictions on the distribution of military weapons
by police officers. 146
B. The Exigency and ProportionalityPrinciplesMay Suggest a
Framework
One theory of regulation for police robots is Professor
Slobogin's exigency and proportionality principles. 147 Under the
proportionality
principle,
the
requisite
level
of
police
certainty-probable cause as to a particular element, reasonable
142.
143.

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See Manmeet Dhindsa, Comment, The Illegality of the DOD 1033 Program: When the

Federal Government Attempts to Side-Step the Posse Comitatus Act, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 107,

108 (2016); Laura Withers, Note, How Bearcats Became Toys: The 1033 Program and Its Effect
on the Right to Protest, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 835-36 (2016).
144.
See Musgrave et al., supra note 33; Withers, supra note 143, at 835; Tess Owen,
America's Largest Police Union Wants Trump to Give Military Gear to Cops Again, BUS. INSIDER
(Dec. 21, 2016, 9:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-largest-police-union-wants-trumpto-give-military-gear-to-cops-20 16-12 [https://perma.cclMC38-NVDM].
Owen, supra note 144.
145.
Joel Ebert, Jeff Sessions in Nashville Outlines Plan to Send Surplus Military
146.
Weapons, Equipment to Local Police, TENNESSEAN
(Aug.
28, 2017,
9:51 AM),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/201 7/08/28/jeff-sessions-nashville-outlines-plan[https://perma.cc/RU6Csend-surplus-military-weapons-equipment-local-police/603661001/
RMB6].
147.
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1,
68 (1991).
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suspicion, or a quantum less than reasonable suspicion-depends on
both the magnitude of the seizure conducted and the particularity of
who is searched. 148 An exigency exception attaches when exigent
circumstances exist, creating an exception to the proportionality
principle. 149 For example, a police checkpoint to stop possible drunk
driving is a relatively minor seizure of a driver: the average stop time
is very short (one drunk-driving checkpoint featured average stop
lengths of twenty-five seconds) unless the police officer detects
possible intoxication, and police stop every car. 15 0
Police must
apprehend drunk drivers before they cause significant harm, creating
high exigency in the situation. 151 As the seizure is mild and the
exigency is high, drunk driving checkpoints do not require reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. 152 In comparison, the arrest of a suspect
represents a far greater seizure than a drunk driving checkpoint. 153
Therefore, it requires probable cause-a much greater degree of
certainty than a drunk driving checkpoint requires. 154
Using potentially lethal force to effect a search or an arrest
requires probable cause that the suspect committed a crime and is
dangerous. 15 5 The Supreme Court mandates exigent circumstances
before police may use deadly force against a suspect. 15 6
The
proportionality principle also applies to the degree of force used
against suspects: the deployment of a SWAT team and flashbang
grenades to execute a warrant requires a greater level of certainty
that the individual poses a threat to officers or others than using
standard police procedure.1 5 7

148.
Id. at 75.
149.
Id.
150.
Id. at 91.
See id. at 54-55.
151.
152.
Id. at 90-91 ("The brief detention of motorists that occurs at the type of roadblock at
issue in [Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)] clearly is not as
intrusive as an arrest. Nor is it as invasive as a stop on the street if, as the Court required, every

car is stopped (thus reducing the potential for harassment and stigmatization) and the occupants
are questioned for only a few moments and allowed to remain in their car (thus reducing the
insult to privacy).").
153.

The Supreme Court explicitly mentions that drunk driving checkpoints are less

intrusive than arrests. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990). In holding
drunk driving checkpoints constitutional, the Court held that drunk driving checkpoints did not
require particularized suspicion. Id. at 455.
154.
See Slobogin, supranote 147, at 68.
Id.
155.
156.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (holding that a police officer must
have probable cause that a fleeing suspect "poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the
officer or to others," before using deadly force to prevent escape).
157.
See id. at 14; Slobogin, supra note 147, at 68.
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While Professor Slobogin intended the exigency and
proportionality principles to function in the absence of the Fourth
Amendment, these concepts can provide a framework and justification
for regulating robotic police force.158 Dallas Police Chief David Brown
acted under extremely exigent circumstances when authorizing the
use of a police robot to kill Michael Xavier Johnson: Johnson, a sniper
with combat experience, had already killed two police officers and
gravely injured several others. 15 9 Using a robot to deploy lethal force
presented the police with a means to end the standoff without
additional loss of police or civilian life.
Envision that police used a robot similar to the Remotec Mark
V-Al to enter a home at 5:30 AM with a valid search warrant founded
on probable cause but not exigent circumstances. 16 0 Police officers
outside used the Mark V-Al's camera features to see that the suspects
were asleep. 161 After viewing the occupants sleeping on camera, the
police detonated a flashbang grenade. Under Professor Slobogin's
theory, not much exigency exists here because the suspect was not
fleeing, the suspect was not threatening the officers, and the suspect
has not just committed a crime. Moreover, the fact that police had
time to procure a warrant suggests that exigent circumstances did not
exist (Supreme Court precedent authorizes warrantless entry only
when exigent circumstances exist). 162 Detonating a potentially deadly
flashbang grenade in a suspect's home while he sleeps likely
constitutes a very intrusive seizure. 163 If the robot entered the home
and detonated the flashbang grenade, the officer did not place his body
into the direct line of danger and uncertainty. Therefore, if deadly
force is presumably a last resort, police have more options before
turning to such extremes. Exhausting these options reduces risk for
all parties in a police interaction.

See Slobogin, supra note 147, at 68.
158.
See Sidner & Simon, supra note 16.
159.
See Mark 5A-1, supra note 31.
160.
See id.
161.
See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that absent exigent
162.
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment mandates a warrant for police entry into a suspect's
home to execute a routine felony arrest); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990)
(authorizing protective sweeps for evidence when apprehending a suspect in his home under
exigent circumstances). In Buie, the police apprehended a suspect who was in his home after
fleeing an armed robbery, and the police did not need a warrant to enter his home. Buie, 494 U.S.
at 327-28.
See, e.g., Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 784-89 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
163.
Slobogin, supra note 147, at 75-77.
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III. SOLUTION

A. Plaintiffs Must Plead That a Robot Executed the Unconstitutional
Force and That Exigency Did Not Exist
The Supreme Court should modify the Saucier test, relaxed by
Pearson, for qualified immunity in excessive force cases where a police
robot commits a violent act. In bringing a § 1983 excessive force
claim, a court should require that a plaintiff sufficiently plead three
elements to establish a rebuttable presumption that no reasonable
officer would have authorized the force: (1) the alleged malignant force
was committed by a robot, not a human; (2) the robot's use of force
violated the petitioner's constitutional rights; and (3) a reasonable
officer would not have found exigent circumstances or imminent
danger at the time. 164 Defeating qualified immunity does not mean
that the plaintiff automatically wins the suit-the plaintiff must still
substantively prove that no reasonable officer would have authorized
the force in light of the circumstances-but the plaintiff gets the
benefit of litigation to determine the facts to do so. 1 6 5 The plaintiff will
further enjoy the benefits of a jury trial to aid in that process. If the
plaintiff successfully pleads all three prongs, a rebuttable presumption
of unreasonableness attaches to the action. To bar discovery, the
defendant police officer must then prove that the action was
reasonable under the circumstances. Mitigating factors in favor of
defeating the presumption may include the dangerousness of the
subject (e.g., whether he is likely to be heavily armed or has a violent
criminal past), the dangerousness of other occupants in the house, and
the criminal act making up the basis of the warrant (e.g., a petty
shoplifting case as opposed to a suspected armed robbery). The
plaintiff will still have to prove the existence of a clearly established
constitutional right in order to prevail on the merits, but he receives
the added benefit of fact-based litigation.
Consider this example of a routine police activity that would
fall within the purview of the presumption of unreasonableness: Police
deploy a robot to scout the premises before executing a routine noknock search warrant at a suspect's home. The police do not have
reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is violent. The robot enters
the home and immediately deploys a flashbang grenade while human
officers wait outside. The flashbang grenade injures both the suspect

Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (concluding that district courts
164.
"should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion" when performing the qualified immunity
analysis).

165.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-99 (1989).
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and his child. After the explosion, the police check footage from the
robot and realize the suspect had been sitting on the living room couch
watching television with his child. No other occupants were in the
home. Deploying a flashbang grenade without first checking the
premises likely violates the Fourth Amendment. 166 Under the current
jurisprudence, the officer controlling the robot likely enjoys qualified
immunity in light of the facts available to the plaintiffs because the
constitutional right was not clearly established such that every
reasonable officer would have seen the use of the purported force as
inappropriate. 16 7 Under this Note's proposed standard, by contrast,
the plaintiffs must plead only that use of the flashbang grenade
violated their Fourth Amendment rights, that a robot deployed the
flashbang grenade, and that no exigent circumstances existed in order
to enable the presumption of unreasonableness and permit discovery.
While this may appear to be a low standard, the goal is to allow these
heavily fact-dependent claims-especially in light of a lack of human
actors-to reach the summary judgment stage.
The primary counterargument to lowering the standard is the
potential deterrent effects stemming from the fear of litigation. Police
departments may hesitate to implement the use of robots if such use
leads to an increased chance of potentially costly litigation. Plaintiffs
bringing claims under § 1983 may also recover attorneys' fees, making
litigation costlier for municipalities and police departments that lose
excessive force suits. 16 8 Municipalities often indemnify their officers,
however, though coverage does not typically include bad faith
conduct. 169 As a result, cities may hesitate to allow funding for police
departments to purchase the equipment. But even cities' hesitation
for funding is not much of a deterrent because many departments can
probably obtain the equipment significantly below cost through the
1033 Program. Further, the lower standard is unlikely to deter the
use of police robots because the primary purpose of the technology is
to make the job of police officers safer, an important goal for police
departments and state and local governments. Ultimately, the value

See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton Cty., 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure
166.
to inspect an area before throwing a flashbang grenade is unreasonable); see also Dukes v.
Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that an officer's deployment of a flashbang
grenade "constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment"), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 72 (2017); Krause v. Jones, 765 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2014) (deploying a flashbang grenade
in an area occupied by innocent parties also weighs against reasonableness); cf. Bender, 600 F.3d
at 784-85 (suggesting possible criteria under which the deployment of a flashbang grenade could
be reasonable).
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97; Dukes, 852 F.3d at 1042.
167.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
168.
169.
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 888, 901 (2014).
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of preserving human lives by deploying police robots as opposed to
humans will likely outweigh the potential costs of additional
lawsuits-not at all a bad thing. Cities will likely use the robots and
risk the lawsuits, which both saves lives and enables a greater chance
of recovery when police operate robots inappropriately or, for robots
themselves act
when
the robots
capacities,
possessing Al
inappropriately.
When exigent circumstances exist, the presumption of
unreasonableness would not apply and the ordinary Graham-PearsonSaucier framework would apply. 170 This exigency exception is crucial
to the test's conformity with past Supreme Court precedent. 171 The
Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Fourth Amendment's
for when exigent
search and arrest warrant requirements
Through the creation of this exigency
circumstances exist. 172
exception, police officers are unlikely to face substantial constraints on
This
the use of police robots in the most dangerous situations.
subjects police officers and departments to decreased risk of liability
in situations where time is of the essence, such as police officers'
"split-second decisions" that enjoy particular deference from the
Threats of imminent danger-where robots
Supreme Court. 173
possess the greatest potential to save lives, such as hostage
negotiations, active shooters, bomb threats, apprehensions of fleeing
felony suspects, and responding to other in-progress violent
crimes-enjoy protection under the exigency exception to traditional
Fourth Amendment violations. The exigency exception also protects
robot action in situations that originated as routine police work (e.g.,
the execution of a search warrant) but later devolve into situations of
imminent danger.
B. Supreme Court Precedent and the Premises of Summary Judgment
Support the Presumption of Unreasonableness
Supreme Court precedent supports the attached presumption
of unreasonableness. The revised Graham standard proposed in this

170.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001).
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (carving out an exigent
171.
circumstances exception for warrantless searches of the home); Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298 (1967) (holding that a warrant was not necessary to enter the house in which a fleeing
suspected armed robber matching the description of a robbery that had just occurred entered the
house).
See Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.
172.
173.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97; Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1042
(11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 72 (2017).
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Note balances society's interest in allowing police officers ample
discretion to do their jobs while recognizing that robots are, simply
put, not humans and thus should not enjoy the same protections as
police officers acting in self-defense or in the defense of others.
The Supreme Court decision in Hope v. Pelzer does not require
the previous litigation of a set of facts for a right to be clearly
established.1 7 4 The Supreme Court held that officials can be on notice
that their conduct violates the law and defeats qualified immunity,
even when dealing with a novel set of facts.17 5 Excessive force by
robots-nonhuman actors-is a novel set of facts, at least for now.
Permitting the litigation of facts following denial of a motion to
dismiss provides plaintiffs the opportunity to litigate motives, policies,
and other relevant information. It also incentivizes municipalities to
thoroughly train their police officers in proper use of robot aides in
order to avoid a costly litigation process.
Finally, lessening the burden on the plaintiff to defeat a claim
of qualified immunity by attaching a presumption of unreasonableness
when a robot actor uses excessive force helps keep legal analysis
Since parties litigate qualified
separate from factual analysis.
immunity at the summary judgment stage, questions of material fact
should theoretically defeat a grant of summary judgment. 176 Qualified
immunity in excessive force cases is one of the most fact-dependent
qualified immunity analyses.17 7 However, whether an official enjoys
qualified immunity is an issue of law, not fact.178 When dealing with
robot liability-a frontier of new technology with very little settled
law-allowing a highly fact-dependent excessive force analysis to take
place at the summary judgment stage contradicts the principles
behind summary judgment.
The use of robots in police work has the potential to make
policing significantly safer for the officers involved. 179 With the
decreased risk to life and limb from use of a police robot in a
nonexigent circumstance, and the doctrinal spirit of qualified

174.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that no qualified immunity
attached when prison guards left an individual outside on a post under the hot sun for seven
hours without a shirt, water, or bathroom breaks-despite no clearly established law against this
conduct-because a reasonable officer would understand such conduct violates the individual's
Eighth Amendment rights).
175.
See id.
176.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
See discussion supra Part I.E.3.
177.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) ("Accordingly, 'we repeatedly have
178.
stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation."' (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam))).
Joh, supra note 18, at 538.
179.

2018]

REVISITING THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY STANDARD

973

immunity intended to protect officers, a heightened standard for
granting qualified immunity in these circumstances protects the
rights granted to all citizens through the Fourth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Dallas police department's use of a police robot to inflict
lethal force arguably saved many lives. It also raises questions as to
how much deference courts should give police officers when police
robots inflict excessive force on civilians. Police use of excessive force
remains a high-profile issue in US society.18 0 However, current
Supreme Court precedent on qualified immunity for constitutional
violations committed by officials fails to take into account acts
committed by nonhuman actors. Lessening the burden of proof for
plaintiffs to defeat a qualified immunity claim when police use a robot
in nonexigent circumstances still supports the need for police officers
to be able to make split-second decisions without the prospect of
litigation.
Moreover, it supports the designation of summary
judgment as a forum for legal analysis in light of the still-unsettled
question of robot liability.
Vid Sankar*

180.
See, e.g., Steven Hale, Why DA Glenn Funk Didn't Press Charges in Jocques
Clemmons
Shooting,
NASHVILLE
SCENE
(May
11,
2017,
3:00
PM),
http://www.nashvillescene.com/news/pith-in-the-wind/article/20861241/why-da-glenn-funk-didntpress-charges-in-jocques-clemmons-shooting [https://perma.ccfLAF4-UCSW]; Tracey Read, City
of Euclid Wants Excessive Force Police Lawsuits Dismissed, NEWS-HERALD (Jan. 30, 2018, 1:23
PM),
http://www.news-herald.com/general-news/20180130/city-of-euclid-wants-excessive-forcepolice-lawsuits-dismissed [https://perma.cc/NVB3-FTTQ].
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